Marquette Law Review
Volume 99
Issue 2 Winter 2015

Article 8

Disciplinary Segregation: How the Punitive
Solitary Confinement Policy in Federal Prisons
Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment in Spite of Sandin v. Conner
Grant Henderson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Repository Citation
Grant Henderson, Disciplinary Segregation: How the Punitive Solitary Confinement Policy in Federal Prisons Violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment in Spite of Sandin v. Conner, 99 Marq. L. Rev. 477 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol99/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION:
HOW THE PUNITIVE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
POLICY IN FEDERAL PRISONS VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT IN SPITE OF SANDIN V. CONNER
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Sandin v. Connor, which held
inmates did not have a protected liberty interest requiring due process
before being placed in solitary confinement. With the increasing
problems in the criminal justice systems nationwide, or perhaps a renewed
interest in those problems, the public has turned its attention to the plight
of the incarcerated. This Comment seeks to flush out the reasoning the
Court provided in Sandin and understand the impacts of the “atypical
and significant hardship” on subsequent prisoner litigation, chiefly
involving solitary confinement. Following the legal analysis of cases, this
Comment will view the process of how prisoners end up in solitary
confinement in federal prisons and then look to the psychological world,
which has provided a number of studies on the effect solitary confinement
has on prisoners. When creating law, it should be informed first and
foremost by reason; it is understandable how the Court made its decision
in Sandin, absent evidence that there is a very real distinction between the
effect of being in general population and the effect of being in solitary
confinement. However, today, almost twenty years after Sandin, we know
there is a substantial difference between the effects each type of
incarceration has on inmates, which is not adequately handled by
administrative proceedings that lack due process. The effect solitary
confinement has on individuals is detrimental to the mental and social
health of inmates and is experienced by few within the prison context, and
knowing this, it is appropriate that solitary confinement be regarded as an
“atypical and significant hardship” within the federal prison context, thus
invoking the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The term “solitary confinement” is broad within the federal prison
context; it can mean an inmate has been placed on either
“administrative detention status,” which is non-punitive,1 or
1. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 5270.10, SPECIAL HOUSING
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“disciplinary segregation status,”2 which is punitive solitary confinement
This Comment is
assigned by a Disciplinary Hearing Officer.3
concerned with the latter. Government-sanctioned punishment requires
due process of law,4 and this Comment contends that the Federal
Bureau of Prison’s current policy for administering disciplinary
segregation does not meet the requisite amount of due process for
imposing such a severe punishment as solitary confinement.
Most recently the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of due process
and solitary confinement in Sandin v. Conner.5 In that case, the
Supreme Court found that the Hawaiian prison policy for placing
inmates in solitary confinement did not impose an “atypical and
significant hardship”6 on inmates and thus did not invoke due process
protections.7 However, that standard both ignores Supreme Court
precedent on due process protections for inmates8 and improperly finds
solitary confinement is not an atypical and significant hardship.9
Additionally, the use of solitary confinement also works against penal
and administrative prison goals, which are often cited in the need for
limited due process in a prison context.10 Flowing from both a proper
understanding that solitary confinement is demonstrably “atypical” and
“significant” and a practical understanding that using solitary
confinement acts counter to penal administrative goals, the current
Federal Bureau of Prisons policy for placing inmates in punitive solitary
confinement clearly violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.

UNITS
2–3
(2011)
(quoting
28
C.F.R.
§ 541.22
(2011)),
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_010.pdf [perma.cc/P5SG-3943].
2. This is the Federal Bureau of Prison’s term for punitive solitary confinement; a
number of states have varying names, so I will use “disciplinary confinement” throughout this
Comment and make distinctions in practice when necessary for analysis. FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(b) (2011)).
3. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 1, at 3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(b) (2011)).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
6. Id. at 484.
7. Id. at 486.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972); see also infra Part V.
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II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES AND INMATE-LITIGANTS PRESANDIN V. CONNER
Prior to the Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner,11 the Supreme
Court developed precedent implicating due process protections when
prison officials altered an inmate’s confinement conditions.12 Morrissey
v. Brewer13 in 1972 and Wolff v. McDonnell14 in 1974 are notable cases in
this precedent. In both cases, the Court found the need for basic due
process protection: The former laid out the bevy of basic protections—
all of which were required in a parole revocation context—and the latter
set the minimal requirements in the incarceration context.15 The only
reading of these cases indicates expansive due process guarantees under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—guarantees that would become
severely restricted later.
A. Morrissey v. Brewer at the Supreme Court
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment16 applied to parolees
facing revocation, thus affording them an opportunity to challenge the
revocation.17 Two parolees claimed they had their parole revoked
without an opportunity for a hearing when parole was revoked on their

11. 515 U.S. 472.
12. See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
13. 408 U.S. 471; see also infra Part II.A.
14. 418 U.S. 539 (1974); see also infra Part II.C.
15. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 489 (establishing that a number of due process
protections were guaranteed despite being limited by the nature of the post-conviction
context); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–67 (explicitly leaving the door open for more due process
protections in the prison context).
16. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are identical in
application to the federal government and states respectively. See, e.g., Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To suppose that ‘due process of
law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous
to require elaborate rejection.”).
17. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472. Though this case concerns parole, not disciplinary
confinement, they both share the important quality of being “an established variation on
imprisonment of convicted criminals.” Id. at 477; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 5270.09, INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM, 12, 14 (2011),
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_009.pdf [perma.cc/VS69-5WZT] (listing both
rescission of parole and disciplinary segregation as possible sanctions for inmates). The
available sanctions are also listed in 28 C.F.R. § 541.3(b) tbl.1 (2015).
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parole officers’ recommendations.18 The Supreme Court agreed with
the parolees’ argument that they had been denied due process.19
In Morrissey, prior to arriving at the Supreme Court, the court of
appeals agreed with the State’s contention that prison officials require
broad discretion when making revocation determinations and “that
courts should retain their traditional reluctance to interfere with
disciplinary matters” under prison authorities’ control.20 However, the
Supreme Court did not agree that parole revocation did not implicate
due process.21
Due process is implicated whenever the state acts to cause an
individual “grievous loss.”22 Revocation implicated loss of liberty, even
though the parolee did not enjoy the “absolute liberty” granted free
citizens.23 Furthermore, society has an interest in treating parolees with
basic fairness.24 The Court then decided, upon determining that due
process applies, what process is due.25 There is no doubt that a “simple
factual hearing will not interfere with the exercise of discretion” of the
state.26
The Court then provided a rough structure of what due process
required. The minimum due process requirements are as follows:

18. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472–73. The State claimed, for the first time before the
Supreme Court, that it had granted hearings to both petitioners; thus, the Court treated the
record from the courts below as fact and denied any claim hearings were granted to
petitioners. Id. at 475–77.
19. See id. at 490.
20. Id. at 475; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1971).
21. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
22. Id. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court determined the nature of the loss by
comparing the liberty interests of a parolee with the liberty interests of a never-convicted
person. Id. at 482. As a side note, it does not affect the analysis whether that liberty is
categorized as a privilege or a right.
23. Id. at 480–82.
24. Id. at 484 (“[F]air treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.”).
25. Id. at 484. Due process is not a rigid standard, but a flexible standard based in
context—“it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kinds of [protections].” Id. at 481.
26. Id. at 483. The Court notes the parole board does not need to concern itself with
providing this process while maintaining a prison. See id. 486. However, a process that
requires witnesses be present at the risk of prisoner and staff safety is not contemplated in
Part VIII—a process that does not allow safety to become a rubber stamp is. See infra Part
VIII.
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(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached”
hearing body[,] . . . which need not be judicial officers or lawyers;
and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking parole.27
This is not as demanding as the full process given throughout criminal
trials; conditioned liberty requires only a narrow, informal review
without the constraints of the rules of evidence.28 The Court provided a
flexible set of process requirements, none too burdensome for any
state.29 These requirements are simple, simply applied, and should serve
as the framework for reviewing, with consequences, the conduct of a
person with limited liberty.
B. Gagnon v. Scarpelli in 1973
The following year, the Supreme Court heard Gagnon v. Scarpelli.30
Scarpelli was convicted of armed robbery in Wisconsin and placed on a
suspended sentence and probation.31 While lawfully residing in Illinois
under the terms of his probation, Scarpelli was caught burglarizing a
home; he confessed to the burglary and later claimed the confession was
false and given under duress.32 His probation was revoked without a
hearing for cavorting with known criminals and for committing the
burglary, and Scarpelli was sent to Green Bay Prison to begin serving
his previously suspended, fifteen-year sentence.33

27. Id. at 489. The Court would later add the right to counsel—or documentation of
refusal of right to counsel—to parolees’ rights at parole revocation hearings. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973). As the Court was presented with new questions
surrounding the due process protections for persons with limited or conditioned liberty
interests, the Court took a strong stance on what protections were owed.
28. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
29. Id. at 490.
30. 411 U.S. 778.
31. Id. at 779.
32. Id. at 779–80.
33. Id. at 780 (noting that at no point was Scarpelli afforded a hearing during his
incarceration).
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Three years into his sentence, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas
corpus.34 However, he was released on parole before any action had
been made on his writ.35 Still, the district court found that the custody of
a parolee conferred jurisdiction and that, due to collateral
consequences, the issue was not moot.36 There, the district court found
that revocation without a hearing and without counsel amounted to a
violation of due process—this was affirmed by the court of appeals.37
The Court began by focusing on the holding of Morrissey v. Brewer:
while not part of the criminal prosecution, the loss of liberty at stake
during a parole revocation38 hearing is sufficient enough to warrant two
distinct hearings.39 Here, the Court reasserted the importance of the
“minimum requirements of due process” granted during a parole
revocation hearing.40 These are the assurances against “ill-considered
revocation,”41 and the Court also added that the need for an indigent
probationer’s or parolee’s representation by counsel at these hearings
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.42
The Court held that, because of the liberty interest, Scarpelli was
owed a revocation hearing and that, due to his claim of duress, he
should also be owed counsel for the determination of his role in the
commission of the burglary.43 Here, the Court espoused the importance

34. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D.
Wis. 1970) (No. 68-C-387).
35. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 780.
36. Scarpelli, 317 F. Supp. at 74.
37. Id. at 74–78, aff’d sub nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
38. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 (the distinction between a parole revocation and probation
revocation is immaterial; neither is part of the criminal prosecution and both result in loss of
liberty).
39. Id. at 781–82 (describing two hearings: the first hearing is to establish probable
cause, and the second hearing—which is more comprehensive—is to determine the final
revocation decision).
40. Id. at 786 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
41. Id. at 786.
42. Id. at 789–90. This is, again, distinct from a criminal prosecution, and thus, the per
se rule demanding indigent representation by counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), is not appropriate; however, representation by counsel will be rare—
“participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary
in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness—
the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for
indigent probationers or parolees.” Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
43. Gagnon, 411 U.S at 791.
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of maintaining fundamental—though not formal—protections when the
loss of liberty was at stake.44
C. Wolff v. McDonnell at the Supreme Court
A year after Scarpelli, the Court took up Wolff v. McDonnell.45 This
case raised the issue of what due process inmates should expect during
disciplinary proceedings that affect the term of confinement.46 In the
Nebraska penal system, an inmate’s “flagrant or serious misconduct” is
punishable through two mechanisms: withholding good-time credits the
inmate previously earned or confinement of the inmate in a disciplinary
cell.47 The former “affects the term of confinement,”48 whereas the
latter “involves alteration of the conditions of confinement.”49
The Court explicitly held that inmates are protected by the
Constitution and the Due Process Clause, even if the rights granted
therein are diminished by the institutional environment of a prison.50
Thus, determining what due process is required during disciplinary
hearings involves balancing the “institutional needs and objectives”51
against the constitutional rights of the inmate.52 Because disciplinary
hearings may result in alteration of the term of confinement, how that
determination is made becomes “critical,” which is to say minimal
procedural safeguards must be in place.53
In the Nebraska scheme the case arose under, the Adjustment
Committee acted as fact finder in disciplinary proceedings and
determined which sanctions were appropriate.54 A charged inmate
44. See id.
45. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
46. Id. at 544–47. Respondent, along with other inmates, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
against the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for denial of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 542.
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(2) (1971). It is realized that the Court used a 1972
supplement to the 1971 version of the Nebraska Revised Statutes; however, the differences
between the 1971 and 1972 versions are minor and irrelevant here. Wolff, 418 U.S. 545 n.5.
48. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 547.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 555–56 (“[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
when he is imprisoned for a crime.”).
51. Id. at 556. One of the goals noted by the Court is the modification of the inmate’s
behavior and values when sanctioning him through a disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 562–63.
52. Id. at 556.
53. Id. at 558.
54. Id. at 549–52 (citing NEB. PENAL & CORR. COMPLEX PENITENTIARY UNIT,
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURE: INMATE CONTROL MISCONDUCT AND THE
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could question the charging officer before the committee but had no
right to call witnesses or present any documentary support in defense of
the charge.55 However, under the scheme, inmates had no notice of the
proceedings,56 so the Court held that the officials must give an inmate
sufficient time “to marshal the facts and prepare a defense.”57
Additionally, the Court held an inmate has the right to call witnesses in
his defense and to present documentary evidence at the hearing.58
Obviously, the Court views due process as granting more than a
superficial right to a defense—even in the context of inmates with
limited liberty interests, the Due Process Clause ensures fairness.
The Court held that current practices in penal systems nationwide
implicated no need for the right to confront one’s accuser or the right to
appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings—due process is a context
dependent determination.59 Still, the Court made note that this opinion
was not “graven in stone” and that there remains a possibility of
extending all of the Morrissey-Scarpelli protections to inmates facing the
loss of good-time credits.60
It is worth noting Justice Marshall’s dissent in this case for one
particular reason: the protections the majority claims inmates have in
these proceedings do not protect the inmate. Without the ability to
confront his accuser or call witnesses, even an innocent inmate “will
invariably be the loser.”61 Unable to call impartial witnesses, the inmate
ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE (1971)) (listing the members of the “Adjustment Committee” as
“the Associate Warden Custody, the Correctional Industries Superintendent, and the
Reception Center Director,” who are likely a neutral and detached hearing body in most
cases).
55. See id. at 552–53 (quoting McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. 616, 625–26 (1972)). The
Court notes that retaliation by prisoners is a concern in administrating disciplinary
proceedings. Id. at 562.
56. Id. at 564.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 566. However, prison officials may still deny witnesses if allowing the witness
would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id.
59. Id. at 568–69.
60. Id. at 571–72.
61. Id. at 581–82 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Even in the prison
context, “[f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense.” Id. at 583 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
Justice Marshall also makes a compelling point about the concern over safety and the right to
confront one’s accuser: Most charges are brought by prison officials, not other inmates, and
when they are brought by inmates, the accuser is likely already known, e.g., the assault victim.
See id. at 586–87, 589 (“[A] substantial majority of the States do permit confrontation and
cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings, and their experience simply does not
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is unlikely to surmount the issue of credibility when charged with
serious misconduct by a prison official.62 Worse than that is the
abridgement of the right itself for the sake of administration when “the
Due Process Clause ‘recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency.’”63 The Court should allow only the most necessary and
minimal limitations to due process: Prisons should no longer limit
defense witnesses as a matter of course, lest the judiciary step in to
protect that fundamental constitutional right, and when it is necessary to
restrict confrontation, the Adjustment Committee should probe the
credibility of the accuser in camera for itself.64 In short, Justice
Marshall’s dissent outlines some very serious problems with the
majority’s application of minimal due process while providing potential
corrections for those problems.
D. Due Process in This Era
Following the holdings of these cases, there is one apparent theme: a
present limitation on liberty does not entail the loss of due process rights
for further restrictions on liberty. While tailored to match the situation
that these plaintiffs faced—e.g., loss of probation-based liberty to
extremely limited liberty during incarceration—each plaintiff was due
some process to protect their liberty interests. Each type of liberty lost
deserved some type of procedural protections because each plaintiff
actually had liberty worth protecting.
Though the Court did not demand the litany of procedural due
process rights granted a defendant at trial, it sought to ensure that no
liberty was stripped away without adequate procedural safeguards.
However, as we examine the state of disciplinary segregation in federal
prisons—a loss of liberty compared with prisoners living in general
populations—in the following part, the lack of procedural safeguards
offered inmates today becomes apparent.
III. THE FEDERAL PROCESS OF DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) currently has a policy for
assigning problematic inmates to solitary confinement, which is

bear out the speculative fears of Nebraska authorities.”).
62. See id. at 583 (citing Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 818 (9th Cir. 1974)).
63. Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972)).
64. Id. at 584, 590.
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examined here for its effectiveness at providing due process.65 The
process for placement in solitary confinement is handled by a number of
individuals and boards at various steps in the process.66 However, this
process, while well reviewed concerning adjudicators, gives little control
to the defendant in ever presenting a viable defense before an
adjudicator.67 The BOP’s efficacy in actuating this policy has even been
called into question by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).68
Ultimately, the BOP’s policy regarding disciplinary segregation leaves
due process protections unsatisfied.
A. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Disciplinary Segregation Policy
The BOP has set forth policies regarding the use of solitary
confinement for disciplinary segregation within its Inmate Discipline
Program.69 This program was last updated July 8, 2011, despite the
GAO recommending a new, refined oversight program in May 2013.70
Following is the current process of determining whether an inmate’s
conduct should be punished with disciplinary confinement.71
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) ultimately determines
whether an inmate should be placed in disciplinary segregation, which
may be up to twelve months for a single offense.72 The discipline

65. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17; see also infra Part III.A.
66. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 541 (2015).
67. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 17–20, 23–36 (citing 28 C.F.R.
§§ 541.5, .7–.8 (2011)).
68. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-429, BUREAU OF
PRISONS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING AND
EVALUATION
OF
IMPACT
OF
SEGREGATED
HOUSING
(2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654349.pdf [perma.cc/U7JJ-ZEQA].
69. See generally FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 541
(2011)).
70. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 1; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., supra note 68, at 42. The GAO also recommended the BOP begin comprehensive
studies regarding the efficacy of disciplinary segregation in correcting inmates’ behavioral
problems and in administrating cost-effective prisons. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
supra note 68, at 42.
71. The current BOP policy is based on the due process requirements set forth in Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 10
n.7. However, the liberty interest involved in Wolff is less than the liberty interest involved in
disciplinary segregation. See infra Part VI.
72. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 14. If an inmate has committed
multiple offenses from “different acts,” then the default is to run those disciplinary
segregation sentences consecutively, not concurrently; twelve months is not the upper bound
of how much time an inmate may spend in solitary confinement for disciplinary purposes. Id.
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process begins when a staff member witnesses, or reasonably believes,
an inmate was involved in a prohibited act and goes on to draft a
detailed factual incident report.73 This report is offered to the inmate
charged with the prohibited act, usually within twenty-four hours, so
that the inmate may prepare a defense.74 A supervisory employee—who
was not “the employee reporting the incident or otherwise . . . involved
in the incident”—is appointed Investigating Officer (IO) by the Warden
to conduct an investigation, which should be completed within twentyfour hours of appointment.75 The IO will inform the inmate of the
charges against him, as well as his right to remain silent.76 Then, the
inmate may request witnesses be interviewed and evidence preserved.77
The first stop for potential imposition of disciplinary segregation for
an inmate is the initial review by the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC),
which is generally composed of at least two staff members not
“significantly involved in the incident”;78 however, it is worth noting that
the UDC may be composed of only one staff member.79 The members
qualified to sit on the UDC must have completed a self-study program.80
Inmates under review may appear before the UDC during review “at
the UDC’s discretion.”81 At his appearance, the inmate may provide
only documentary evidence in support of his innocence, and the UDC’s
decision must be made “based on at least some facts.”82 If the UDC
determines the inmate did commit the prohibited act, and it believes

These lengthy disciplinary segregation sentences are discussed in infra Part VI.B. It is worth
noting that such offenses as “[i]nsolence towards a staff member,” “[f]ailing to stand count,”
altering or damaging another inmate’s or government property “having a value of $100.00 or
less,” or “[b]eing unsanitary or untidy” may earn an inmate up to three months in disciplinary
segregation. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 50–52 tbl.1 (quoting 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.3(a) tbl.1 (2011)).
73. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 17 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) (2011)).
74. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) (2011)).
75. Id. at 18. The inmate does not receive a copy of the IO’s report. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 18 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b)(1) (2011)).
77. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b)(2) (2011)).
78. Id. at 23 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.7 (2011)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 24 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(d) (2011)).
82. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(e) (2011)). The inference to be drawn is that the
UDC may not find guilt based only on the inmate’s remaining silent. See id. at 18 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 541.5(b)(1)(B) (2011)). Given that the incident report is launched by a staff
member, there is already some evidence against the inmate; no right to call witnesses may
prove detrimental to the inmate’s defense where documented evidence is lacking.
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disciplinary segregation is appropriate, the UDC must refer the incident
to the DHO.83
Along with its recommendation for disciplinary segregation, the
UDC submits copies of all relevant documents and reasons for referral
to the DHO.84 The UDC also gives a copy of its decision to refer to the
inmate and instructs him of his rights before the DHO.85 The inmate
may appeal the UDC’s referral.86
The DHO is an impartial decision maker, who is unconnected to the
incident in question and has received specialized training and
certification.87 The inmate is given notice of the charges against him at
least twenty-four hours in advance.88
An inmate may request or may upon need—e.g., illiteracy—have a
staff member appointed to assist and represent him in the DHO hearing
process.89 This representative aids the inmate in understanding the
The
charges against him and the possible consequences.90
representative will also help the inmate “speak[] with and schedule[]
witnesses, obtain[] written statements, and otherwise help[] [the inmate]
prepare evidence for presentation.”91 The inmate is allowed to appear
before the DHO during the hearing.92
During the hearing, the inmate is granted certain procedural
safeguards; however, the DHO hearing may use “written statements of
witnesses not readily available,” which may be “liberally used in place of
in-person witnesses.”93 This raises a serious concern over the actual
function of witnesses at the DHO hearing—for example, “the DHO
need not call witnesses adverse to you if their testimony is adequately
summarized in the incident report or other investigation materials,”
which means there is no right to confront an accuser.94 Further concern

83. Id. at 24–25 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(f)–(g) (2011)).
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(g) (2011)).
86. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(g) (2011)).
87. Id. at 27 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b) (2011)).
88. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(c) (2011)).
89. Id. at 27–28 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)(1) (2011)).
90. Id. at 28 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)(2) (2011)).
91. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)(2) (2011)).
92. Id. at 28–29 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(e) (2011)).
93. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(2) (2011)); see also Patterson v. Superior
Court of Cal., 420 U.S. 1301 (1975).
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arises from the DHO’s complete, discretionary control over what
questions are asked of the witnesses that do appear—the inmate has no
right to question the accuser, and his right to confront an accuser may be
limited to receiving the witness’s prepared written statement.95
Furthermore, the DHO does not have to call any witnesses requested by
the inmate if he does not believe the testimony will be helpful.96 The
DHO is also allowed to rely on information from a confidential
informant he “finds reliable”; the informant will not be revealed to the
inmate facing punishment, and what portions of his testimony may be
made available to the inmate are done so at the DHO’s discretion.97
Compounding this problem is that, again, the DHO need only make a
determination of guilt on “some facts,” as was the case before the
UDC.98
Upon determining an inmate’s guilt, the DHO will submit a written
report to the charged inmate, which will include the following: whether
the inmate was advised of his rights, what evidence the DHO relied on,
what the DHO decided, what sanction the DHO imposed, and what
reasons underlie that sanction.99 The inmate has the opportunity to
appeal to the Regional Director at the Bureau of Prisons.100 Though
prisoners do not enjoy the panoply of due process rights owed free
citizens, the current process seems to lack or severely condition some
fundamental rights of due process.101
B. The Government Accountability Office’s Evaluation of the Federal
Bureau of Prison’s Policy in Practice
Due to the growing concerns over America’s prison systems, U.S.
Senator Richard Durbin, joined by two other U.S. congressmen,
requested the GAO investigate the BOP’s use of segregated housing.102
95. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 30–32 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)
(2011)).
96. Id. at 31 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(2)–(3) (2011)).
97. Id. at 30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(6) (2011)). “Uncorroborated confidential
information from a single informant is insufficient as the sole basis for a finding, unless the
circumstances of the incident and the knowledge possessed by the informant are convincing
enough to show that the information must be reliable.” Id. at 32.
98. Id. at 29–30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f) (2011)).
99. Id. at 34 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(h) (2011)).
100. Id. at 35 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(i) (2011)).
101. E.g., the right to confront one’s accuser, question him, and call witnesses in one’s
defense. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 1–2.
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The GAO completed its report in May 2013.103 The report raised
concerns over the effectiveness of current BOP segregated housing
policy in achieving penal goals.104
The GAO’s study covers the BOP’s care and custody of over 200,000
federal inmates.105
At interest here are the inmates placed in
disciplinary segregation and, more particularly, those in single-person
cells for disciplinary confinement placed at the Florence Administrative
Maximum Facility (ADX).106 The BOP claims that it does not hold
anyone in solitary confinement because guards regularly visit with
inmates, inmates may interact during recreation times, and inmates in
adjoining cells may communicate;107 however, these inmates may be
confined to these restrictive conditions twenty-three hours a day for
years at a time.108
The BOP has a centralized Program Review Division (PRD), which
completes reviews of the Special Housing Units (SHU) and Special
Management Units (SMU)—less restrictive disciplinary segregation
schemes109—every three years based on specific monitoring policies.110
However, there are no such specific monitoring requirements for ADX
confinement, and it is not scrutinized to the same degree when
reviewed.111 The BOP says this policy is in place, in part, because all
ADX referrals and placements are monitored by BOP headquarters and
placements are reviewed every sixty to ninety days.112 The GAO raised
issue with the lack of actual oversight BOP headquarters has in

103. Id. at 1.
104. See id. at 41–42. This report only concerns the inmates of the 119 BOP-operated
facilities, so the study does not cover issues arising from privately managed prisons. Id. at 1
n.1.
105. Id. at 1. The federal prison population has grown by 400% since the 1980s, and
with that has come the increased use of “highly restrictive conditions.” Id.
106. See id. at 9 fig.2.
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 12 & n.11, 22.
109. See id. at 7 fig.1.
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id. at 22–23 (“BOP HQ lacks oversight over the extent to which ADX staff are in
compliance with many ADX-specific requirements related to conditions of confinement and
procedural protections to the same degree that it has for SHUs and SMUs. According to
PRD officials, PRD does not assess the extent to which ADX provides conditions of
confinement or procedural protections as required under ADX policy and program
statements because it is not required to do so. As a result, PRD cannot report to BOP
management on the extent of compliance with these ADX-specific requirements.”).
112. Id. at 22.
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determining whether ADX policies are being followed and
recommended tighter monitoring be put in place to ensure ADXspecific policies were followed.113 The GAO emphasized the importance
of monitoring implementation and execution of programming to ensure
effective administration and achievement of governmental goals.114
The GAO also found the BOP’s lack of documentation
concerning.115 Specifically, in its report the GAO stressed the lack of
documentation relating to procedural protections and conditions of
confinement.116 Upon reviewing fifty-one case files of inmates placed in
disciplinary segregation, only forty-two of them provided the underlying
reason for disciplinary segregation.117 The BOP claimed that a new
software program—SHU application118—would help the documentation
issues in its prisons; however, the BOP was unable to articulate its goals
and objectives in using the new software or how the software would
address the documentation problems.119 Overall, the GAO found the
BOP’s ADX monitoring lacking and recommended new requirements

113. See id. at 22, 24.
114. See id. at 24 (“The [Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government]
state, among other things, that monitoring activities are an integral part of an entity’s
planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government
resources and achieving effective results. Specific requirements for PRD to monitor ADXspecific policies to the same degree that these requirements exist for SHUs and SMUs could
help provide BOP HQ additional assurance that ADX officials are following BOP policies to
hold inmates in a humane manner, in its highest security, most restrictive facility.”); see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-704G, STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665712.pdf
[perma.cc/EJ7Y-5N39]. The Acting Assistant Director of PRD agreed such monitoring
mechanisms should be implemented. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at
24.
115. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 25 (“[GAO] reviewed
45 PRD monitoring reports from 20 prisons that assessed compliance at [lower-level
disciplinary segregation units]. PRD identified deficiencies in 38 of these reports, including
documentation concerns in 30 reports.”).
116. Id. at 25. There was not clear documentation that inmates in disciplinary
segregation were given all their meals or their daily hour for exercise—“documentation at
these prisons did not clearly indicate that these standards were always observed.” Id.
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id. at 28. SHU application is a new software program for SHUs and SMUs that
“could improve the documentation of the conditions of confinement in SHUs and SMUs,
but . . . may not address all the deficiencies . . . identified.” Id.
119. Id. at 28–29 (describing how the BOP did not provide evidence because the
software program was too new to provide data for evaluation of its impact on the lack of
documentation in BOP prisons).
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be developed to ensure inmates receive their procedural protections and
conditions of confinement.120
C. Solitary Confinement Today
It is apparent from the BOP’s punitive solitary confinement process
alone that placing an inmate in solitary confinement is a one-sided
endeavor. These inmates are not given any meaningful opportunity to
present a viable defense—an essential aspect of due process—which
goes against the precedent established by the Supreme Court in the line
of cases flowing from Morrissey v. Brewer.121 This is a process that the
GAO calls into question for effectiveness. However, the process the
BOP employs does not arise from nothing.
The following part addresses Sandin v. Conner, a Supreme Court
case addressing the rights retained by inmates facing solitary
confinement.122 The Court issued a short standard for reviewing those
rights,123 but the standard is not simple, particularly in light of modern
psychology and statistics.124
IV. SANDIN V. CONNER: EFFECTS ON THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR
INMATE-LITIGANTS CONCERNING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided the last case concerning
punitive solitary confinement in Sandin v. Conner.125 This case offered
the standard “atypical and significant hardship” that must be found in
change-of-confinement situations to warrant due process protections.126
This has led to few cases elaborating on that standard from lower courts,
all of which will be described and analyzed in the following part.127 The
questions are whether the Court gave sufficient guidance and whether
its decision comports with what the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments require under Wolff v. McDonnell.128

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See id. at 42.
408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also supra Part II.
515 U.S. 472 (1995).
See id. at 483–84.
See infra Part IV.
515 U.S. 472.
Id. at 483–84, 486.
See infra Part IV.A, IV.B.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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A. Sandin v. Conner at the Supreme Court
DeMont Conner was an inmate at a Hawaii maximum-security
prison.129 When a prison guard attempted a strip search and inspection
of Conner’s rectum, he pulled away from the guard and used
profanity.130 He was charged with “high misconduct” for pulling away
from the guard and “low moderate misconduct” for cursing at the
guard.131
Conner subsequently appeared before the Adjustment
Committee, which rejected his request to call witnesses for his
defense.132 The committee found him guilty of those prohibited
conducts and “sentenced him to 30 days’ disciplinary segregation.”133
Nine months later, one of the deputy administrators found the
misconduct charges unsupported and expunged Conner’s record.134
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of Conner’s claim
that the limited process granted him by the Adjustment Committee
violated the Due Process Clause under Wolff v. McDonnell.135
However, the Supreme Court did not view the precedent as favorable to
Conner’s case, holding that—despite the later factual determination that
Conner was not guilty of the prohibited conduct for want of evidence—
all due process requirements had been fulfilled.136 The Court focused on
what rights flow from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself rather than whether the State had created a liberty
interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation.137
The focal point of the majority’s argument is that the case line
following Wolff created two issues: due process analysis now focuses on
state-created liberty interests and disincentivizes states from codifying
prison regulations, and that that approach “has led to the involvement
of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons.”138 The
Court stated that the focus on the language of a given statute or
regulation, rather than a focus on “the nature of the deprivation,” has
129. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 474–75.
130. Id. at 475.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 476.
135. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1467–68 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
136. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–487.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 482.
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led inmates to litigate over any and all interests they can find in prison
regulations, even when successful litigation bears “little . . . benefit to
anyone.”139 The Court stated that Conner’s punishment was not the
type of “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”140 Obviously, abuse of the court
system is a serious concern, but these arguments seem to distract from
the case at hand, which involved a serious liberty interest: the movement
to severely confined disciplinary segregation. While the reasoning in
Sandin explicitly supports the holding in Wolff—to analyze based on the
nature of the deprivation of the liberty141—its application of that analysis
is flawed.
B. Wilkinson v. Austin at the Supreme Court
Ten years after Sandin, the Supreme Court addressed what
procedure is required under the Fourteenth Amendment when
assigning an inmate to a “Supermax” prison facility.142 The Ohio
Supermax facility at issue in this case—the Ohio State Penitentiary
(OSP)—was designed to be highly restrictive, comprised of 504 singleinmate cells designed to keep the most violent and dangerous offenders
separated from the general prison population.143
The cells at the OSP were extremely solitary in design—“[i]t is fair
to say OSP inmates are deprived . . . of almost all human contact.”144
Inmates were placed in these cells for an indefinite period of time,
limited only by the length of their sentence.145 Inmates are placed at
139. Id. 481–82.
140. Id. at 484.
141. Id. at 482–83.
142. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005). “Supermax facilities are maximumsecurity prisons with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous
prisoners from the general prison population.” Id. The Ohio Supermax facility is the most
restrictive incarceration available in the state, more restrictive than any Ohio administrative
control units—“a highly restrictive form of solitary confinement”—or even death row. Id. at
214. “About 30 States now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two somewhat
comparable facilities operated by the Federal Government.” Id. at 213–14.
143. Id. at 214 (the inmates at the Supermax facility could leave their cell for one hour a
day); see also CORR. INST. INSPECTION COMM., CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION INSPECTION
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF OHIO STATE
PENITENTIARY
2–3
(2015),
http://ciic.state.oh.us/docs/Ohio%20State%20Penitentiary%202015.pdf
[perma.cc/PGX2ENT8].
144. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214.
145. Id. at 214–15 (“For an inmate serving a life sentence, there is no indication how
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OSP based on the nature of their crimes or their conduct while in
prison;146 the process is initiated by a prison official, and then reviewed
by three groups—any of which may terminate the process.147
The notable due process issue in this case is the inmate’s complete
lack of ability to call witnesses in his defense.148 Here, the Court
reasserted its prior holdings that no due process violation occurs by
placing inmates in more restrictive custody.149 The Court held that the
solitary confinement of the inmates at OSP did create a protectable
liberty interest, which was affected by the “atypical and significant
hardship”; however, the Court also held the policy in place adequately
addressed due process concerns.150
C. Stark Contrast
These cases hold a remarkably different tenor toward inmates’ rights
than the cases arising out of the Morrisey case line.151 Inmates have an
extremely limited opportunity for due process, and what is available to
them is one-sided. However, these holdings are flawed in their
reasoning because these prison practices are flawed in effectiveness and
practicality, which is discussed in the following part.152 Flawed, also, is
the assertion that a punishment must be “atypical and significant” to
trigger due process protections, yet what is considered “atypical and
significant” punishment excludes solitary confinement, which is a
premise examined both statistically and scientifically in a further part.153
V. SANDIN V. CONNER WRONGLY ASSUMES EFFECTIVE PRISON
ADMINISTRATION AND PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS
The Supreme Court held that imposition of solitary confinement
“effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals.”154
However, this is a presumption not supported by the evidence.155 The

long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there.”).
146. Id. at 216.
147. Id. at 216–17.
148. Id. at 216.
149. Id. at 221–22 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)).
150. Id. at 223, 230.
151. See supra Part II.
152. See infra Part V.
153. See infra Part VI.
154. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
155. See infra Parts V.A, V.B.

2015]

DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION

497

use of solitary confinement limits effective prison administration and
creates a population more inclined to reoffend.156
A. Solitary Confinement Increases the Need for Prison Administration,
Spreading Limited Resources More Thinly Than Before
Prisons are expensive institutions and require incredible amounts of
administration to function.157 However, the cost of generic prisons pales
in comparison with the cost of disciplinary segregation units. The
GAO’s report estimated the cost of administration for the varying levels
of security institutions.158 The daily inmate per capita cost at one of the
BOP high security facilities is $69.41.159 Comparatively, the daily per
capita of inmates in Special Management Units (SMU)—restrictive
compared to general-population, disciplinary segregation160—is $119.71,
despite being in the same facility as general population.161 However,
even the cost of the SMU is far below the daily per capita for inmates in
ADX, which totals $216.12 daily.162 The annual cost of ADX was
roughly $34 million to house 435 inmates in 2012.163 This is not unique
to the federal system; Alexa Steinbuch found that Supermax facilities in
Arizona cost “up to three times as much as general prison housing” and
it costs 45% more to house inmates in solitary confinement than general
population in Texas.164 Obviously, this calls into question the fiscal
responsibility underlying the BOP policy of ADX disciplinary
segregation.
One of the fundamental goals of prison administration is safety.165
However, there is little evidence to suggest disciplinary segregation
furthers that goal166—it may even function contrary to that goal.167
156. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 39.
157. See id. at 30–32.
158. Id. at 29–32.
159. Id. at 31.
160. Id. at 7 fig.1.
161. Id. at 31.
162. Id. (comparing the daily per capita cost for ADX inmates with the daily per capita
of $85.74 for non-ADX inmates in the same facility).
163. Id. at 32. Additionally, the current annual cost of SMU is $87 million. Id. If all
these SMU inmates were housed in medium or high security facilities, the cost would annually
total $42 million and $50 million, respectively. Id.
164. Alexa T. Steinbuch, The Movement Away from Solitary Confinement in the United
States, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 499, 502 (2014).
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
166. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 33.
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Despite the continued claim that disciplinary confinement is essential to
prison administration,168 the BOP has never conducted a study on the
efficacy of disciplinary segregation in achieving more peaceful prison
administration.169
The BOP noted that there had been an overall drop in prison
assaults and lockdowns, despite an increase in prison population, but
were unable in any way to link it to the use of disciplinary
confinement.170 During its study, the GAO reviewed five states’ use of
disciplinary segregation, all of which instituted new policies directed at
minimizing the population in disciplinary segregation.171 All five states
reported no increase in prison violence after moving segregated
prisoners to less restrictive housing—under the revised standards,
Mississippi found 80% of its disciplinary segregation inmates were
inappropriately placed in disciplinary segregation, and Colorado
reported 37% of its inmates in disciplinary segregation did not require
that level of security.172 In addition, these two states also reported large
savings following the closings of segregated housing units.173 Limiting
the use of solitary confinement—through the use of adequate due
process—can serve administrative and pragmatic governmental interests
far better than the current level of use.
B. Recidivism Rates Are Higher for Prisoners Who Were in Disciplinary
Segregation
There is serious concern that extended time in solitary confinement
causes high rates of recidivism.174 Steinbuch suggests it is the lack of
human interaction over time “without the opportunity to engage in the
types of interaction, treatment, and educational experiences” that causes
such high recidivism rates among these inmates.175 An estimated 40% of
Supermax inmates from California and Colorado were “directly
167. Press Release, Dick Durbin, Senator, Durbin Chairs First-Ever Congressional
Hearing
on
Solitary
Confinement
(June
19,
2012),
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-chairs-first-ever-congressionalhearing-on-solitary-confinement [perma.cc/JC64-9DEA].
168. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1974).
169. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 33.
170. Id. at 33–34.
171. Id. at 34 (the states studied were Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, and Ohio).
172. Id. at 34–35.
173. Id. at 34.
174. See Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 502.
175. Id.
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released from total isolation.”176 It is no surprise that inmates who have
spent significant amount of time in solitary confinement conditions
reoffend at a higher rate than their general population counterparts.177
C. Failed Goals
For the abovementioned reasons, it is apparent that the use of
solitary confinement abjectly fails the practical goals of its penological
use. Solitary confinement complicates prison administration rather than
simplifying it and heavily increases the cost of prison administration.
Furthermore, its use limits the chance for success concerning inmates’
abilities to keep from reoffending and reintegrate into society.
However, as discussed in the following part,178 those are not the only
reasons the use of solitary confinement fails to meet the Court’s holding
in Sandin.179
VI. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS AN “ATYPICAL AND SIGNIFICANT
HARDSHIP” UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Court has stated that liberty interests must arise from some type
of or rule or regulation,180 so to challenge the BOP’s policies there must
be something within the policy granting those rights. Arguably at issue
in disciplinary segregation, the BOP created a liberty interest in
promising no disciplinary sanctions may be imposed in a “capricious”
manner.181 Discussed below is how the BOP’s current policy qualifies as
the imposition of an “atypical and significant hardship” lacking
appropriate due process and how solitary confinement is “a dramatic
departure from the basic condition[] of [an] indeterminate sentence.”182
A. Disciplinary Confinement Is Atypical
The “atypical” requirement set forth in Sandin is not explained.183

176. Id.
(citing
End
the
Overuse
of
Solitary
Confinement,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/stop_solitary_-_two_pager.pdf [perma.
cc/95B8-Z2RU] (last visited Dec. 29, 2015)).
177. See id. at 511.
178. See infra Part VI.
179. 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995).
180. See id. at 482.
181. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 1 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2011)).
The Inmate Discipline Program is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2012).
182. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
183. Id. at 484.
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There is no metric against which to compare whether a hardship is
atypical. So it is best to turn to the plain meaning and understanding of
the word: “irregular [or] unusual.”184 At issue is whether disciplinary
segregation in the BOP constitutes an unusual punishment.
Disciplinary segregation in the BOP does constitute an atypical
hardship. The BOP is responsible for 217,000 federal inmates.185 Of
those inmates, only 12,460 are placed in disciplinary segregation—a
mere 7% of the federal inmates were segregated.186 Certainly an issue
affecting only 7% of a population could be viewed as atypical.
Furthermore, what is really at issue here are those placed in solitary
disciplinary segregation (ADX),187 which is a total of approximately 435
inmates in the entire federal prison system.188 The 435 inmates in ADX
segregation divided into the total federal prison population of 217,000
equates to roughly 0.2%.189 Even if this number were five times what it
currently is—then totaling a whole percent—the placement of any
inmate in solitary disciplinary segregation would certainly constitute an
atypical hardship. Thus, any inmate in ADX is suffering an atypical
hardship within the federal prison system.
B. Empirical Evidence Has Shown Solitary Confinement Is a Significant
Hardship to Inmates
Disciplinary segregation involves solitary confinement for twentythree hours a day.190 The significant hardship facing inmates placed in
disciplinary confinement, chiefly in ADX in federal prisons, is the loss of
mental well-being.191 At a hearing on the use of solitary confinement in
the United States, Congress heard evidence from multiple state and
national studies, which concluded “[f]ifty percent of all prison suicides
occur in solitary confinement.”192
Loss of liberty is certainly
184. Atypical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 1.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Inmates are alone in their cells for about twenty-three hours a day. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1–2.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) [hereinafter Reassessing Solitary
Confinement] (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary);
Press Release, Dick Durbin, supra note 167.
192. Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191, at 2; see also Press Release, Dick
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contemplated when sentencing an individual; however, the loss of
mental acuity is certainly not.
Solitary confinement may cause a variety of “negative psychological
reactions” including depression, anxiety, decreased brain function,
hallucinations, impulse control, and self-mutilation.193 Dr. Craig Haney,
who testified before Congress on the mental effects of solitary
confinement,194 has stated that published studies have exclusively found
ten days in Supermax or solitary confinement conditions precipitates
negative psychological effects in inmates.195
Dr. Stuart Grassian studied fifteen inmates in solitary confinement
at a facility in Massachusetts—their mean age was twenty-eight, and the
average stay in solitary was two months.196 Among the inmates he
interviewed, Dr. Grassian found all of the negative psychological issues
listed above; he found the “specific psychiatric symptoms reported were
strikingly consistent among the inmates.”197 Dr. Grassian also stated
that the specific effects of solitary confinement may establish a
“clinically distinguishable syndrome.”198
The present concern is whether the BOP’s ADX program causes
psychological effects. Unfortunately, the BOP has never studied the
long-term effects of its ADX program on inmates, which the GAO
raised issue with in its report.199 The BOP has psychologists meet with
ADX inmates on a weekly basis and perform an assessment every thirty
days after placement, and the psychologists have found no negative
psychological effects among their inmates;200 however, it may be worth
Durbin, Senator, Durbin Statement on Federal Bureau of Prisons Assessment of its Solitary
Confinement Practices (Feb. 04, 2013), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/durbin-statement-on-federal-bureau-of-prisons-assessment-of-its-solitary-confineme
nt-practices [perma.cc/9DSL-UCZF].
193. Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 501 (citing Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner,
Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104–05 (2010)); see also Stuart Grassian,
Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983).
194. Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191, at 20–21 (statement of Dr. Craig
Haney, Professor of Psychology at University of California, Santa Cruz).
195. Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 510 (quoting Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in
Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. CONFINEMENT 124,
132 (2003)).
196. Grassian, supra note 193, at 1451.
197. Id. at 1452.
198. Id. at 1453.
199. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 38.
200. Id. at 38–39.
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noting that when studying the Massachusetts inmates, Dr. Grassian
stated all the inmates he met denied any negative psychological issues
and only began to describe their mental anguish upon particularized and
prying questions.201 The GAO also noted in its report that the studies it
relied on overwhelmingly supported the proposition that long-term
solitary confinement causes negative psychological effects.202
The studies that have been conducted on the effects of long-term
solitary confinement resoundingly point to a single truth: Solitary
confinement likely causes negative psychological effects on inmates.
And while the BOP claims there are no negative impacts from longterm disciplinary confinement,203 the BOP’s Psychology Services Manual
“recognizes that extended periods of confinement in Administrative
Detention or Disciplinary Segregation Status may have an adverse
effect on the overall mental status of some individuals.”204 At
sentencing, a convict’s physical liberty is lost, but—other than the goal
to encourage better morals and good character—never is the loss of his
mental liberty contemplated. There is no question this is a significant
hardship.
C. The Federal Government Has Recognized How Problematic Solitary
Confinement Is for Inmates
Recently, there has been movement in both the Legislative and
Executive Branches to investigate and correct the problems of solitary
confinement.
Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois has held two
congressional hearings—in 2012 and 2014—investigating the current use
of solitary confinement;205 during both hearings, Senator Durbin stated
that solitary confinement is overused in America.206 In response to the

201.
202.
203.
204.

Grassian, supra note 193, at 1451–52.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 39.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40 (quoting FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 5310.12,
PSYCHOLOGY SERVICES MANUAL § 4.2 (1995)).
205. Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191; Reassessing Solitary Confinement
II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences, 113th Cong (2014) [hereinafter
Reassessing Solitary Confinement II], http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/reassessingsolitary-confinement-ii-the-human-rights-fiscal-and-public-safety-consequences [perma.cc/M
K6M-JGWD].
206. Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191; Reassessing Solitary Confinement
II, supra 205; see also ACLU, BRIEFING PAPER: THE DANGEROUS OVERUSE OF SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
14
(2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/stop_solitary_briefing_paper_updated_august_2

2015]

DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION

503

same problem, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
implemented new monitoring requirements and a new policy on the use
of solitary confinement.207 Both of these—along with the recent GAO
report208—evidence government-recognized problems of current policies
underlying the use of solitary confinement.
At Senator Durbin’s first congressional hearing, he noted that the
United States employs solitary confinement more than any other
democratic nation and said, “The dramatic expansion of the use of
solitary confinement is a human rights issue we can’t ignore.”209 He
called attention to the current policy’s impact on inmates’ mental health
and the impact that has on the nation’s safety.210 Dr. Craig Haney, a
psychology professor, testified before Congress that solitary
confinement “can lead to mental illness, self-mutilation and a
‘disturbingly high’ rate of suicide.”211 Congress also heard testimony
evidencing the use of solitary confinement increases violence among
prisoners and the fiscal irresponsibility underlying the use of solitary
confinement.212 At the end of the first hearing, Senator Durbin said,
“All of these issues lead to the obvious conclusion: we need to reassess
solitary confinement and honestly reform policies which do not make us
safer.”213
ICE has recently revised its policies regarding the use of disciplinary
segregation.214 Aimed at correcting the abuses that pervade solitary
confinement practices, ICE requires that any detainee placed in solitary

014.pdf [perma.cc/5KNY-ZUZB].
207. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, NO. 11065.1, REVIEW OF THE USE OF
SEGREGATION FOR ICE DETAINEES (2013), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionreform/pdf/segregation_directive.pdf [perma.cc/ZUC4-LTRQ]; see also ACLU, supra note
206, at 12.
208. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68; see also supra Part III.B
(providing a detailed discussion of the GAO report).
209. Press Release, Dick Durbin, supra note 167 (noting that nationwide, roughly
80,000 of the more than 2.3 million inmates are held in “some kind of restricted detention,”
which is approximately 3.5% of the prison population).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 207. “Because ICE is
comparable to BOP in many ways, including its extensive national network of governmentrun and private contract facilities, the ICE directive sets a strong example of rigorous
monitoring and substantive requirements which BOP can and should follow.” ACLU, supra
note 206, at 12.
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confinement should be reviewed within seven days and every week
thereafter.215 During these reviews, the supervisor interviews the
detainee to ensure he has “received all services to which he . . . is
entitled.”216 During the weekly review, the supervisor should always
consider alternative housing options and is assisted by ICE headquarters
in making any alternative placement.217 Where solitary confinement is
appropriate, the supervisor is encouraged to limit the amount of solitary
by adding to the detainees’ out-of-cell time and arranging for the
detainees participation in group activities.218 All reports require “clear
articulation” of whether the reason for placement in solitary
confinement was valid and whether that reason remains valid.219 If there
are cases of particular note or concern, they will be regularly reviewed
by the Detention Monitoring Council at ICE headquarters, which is
comprised of a variety of ICE management.220 The goal of ICE’s new
policy is clear: minimize the use of solitary confinement.
Both the congressional hearings on solitary confinement in the
United States and ICE’s new policy support the inferences that there
are serious issues with the current use of solitary confinement in the
United States and that there is a growing public concern over its use.
This is further supported by the roughly 90% drop in solitary
confinement population in Mississippi and Colorado and 50% drop in
Washington’s solitary confinement population.221
VII.OVERTURNING PRECEDENT
The following part describes what conditions must be present to
overturn Supreme Court precedent, whether by the Supreme Court
itself or by the courts generally restricted by Supreme Court precedent.
Those reasons include recent cases’ inconsistency with prior Supreme
Court precedent and a change in social values. Developing those
reasons in the context of Sandin v. Conner,222 it is apparent the
holding—though not the logic—in that case should no longer have
precedential value.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 207, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 10–11.
See Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 502.
515 U.S. 472 (1995).
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A. Overturning Supreme Court Precedent
One of the fundamental rules in American law is “stare decisis,”
which is to say when a higher court issues a holding that should be
followed by all courts below.223 However, while there has long been the
belief that this rule outweighed the actual determination of a holdings’
rightness,224 there has also been the belief that prior holdings could be
mistakenly made and should be overturned.225 Thus, a variety of
reasons have developed to overturn Supreme Court precedent.226 The
holding at issue in Sandin implicates two strong reasons for overturning
precedent: inconsistency with other Supreme Court decisions and
changed societal conditions.227
The first reason to overturn a Supreme Court precedent is its
inconsistency with other Supreme Court holdings.228 A strong example
of this is the case of Hobbs v. Thompson.229 That case dealt with the
political speech rights of public employees.230 In that case, the Fifth
Circuit held the decision in United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell231 ran afoul of First Amendment cases decided “as early as
1940.”232 Those cases demanded any law effecting First Amendment
rights must be narrowly drawn, contrary to the holding in Mitchell; the
Fifth Circuit found those cases accurately captured the protections owed
to First Amendment rights and found Mitchell was no longer good
law.233 This demonstrates the importance of consistency within the law,
which may rely on a history of developed case law rather than a singular
decision.
223. Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 54 (1982).
224. Id. at 55 (“Justice Brandeis wrote: ‘Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right.’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
225. Id. (“Justice Cardozo observed that ‘the whole subject matter of jurisprudence is
more plastic, more malleable, the [moulds] less definitively cast, the bounds of right and
wrong less preordained and constant, than most of us . . . have been accustomed to believe.’”
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161 (1921)).
226. See id. at 61–71.
227. Id. at 68–70.
228. Id. at 68.
229. 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
230. Id. at 457.
231. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
232. Hobbs, 448 F.2d at 471–72.
233. Id. at 472–73.
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The second reason to overturn a Supreme Court precedent is
changed societal conditions.234 In 1943, the Supreme Court held that a
school regulation compelling students to salute the flag was
unconstitutional.235 When discussing a shift in American attitudes
concerning the role of government in citizens’ affairs, Justice Jackson
wrote:
These changed conditions often deprive precedents of reliability
and cast us more than we would choose upon our own judgment.
But we act in these matters not by authority of our competence
but by force of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest
estimates of our competence in such specialties as public
education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as
the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.236
This is a strong statement on the value of the national zeitgeist in law.
What this case suggests, and Professor Kniffin asserts, is that noticeable
and pervasive social trends have the potential to influence Supreme
Court decisions, even in the face of contrary precedent.237
B. Overturning Sandin v. Conner
When an individual is facing imprisonment at the fault of bad
precedent, that court has a strong interest in resolving that case against
precedent—loss of liberty is a powerful interest justifying a challenge to
precedent.238
While Sandin holds that inmates in disciplinary
confinement do not have a liberty interest warranting strong due process
protections, in light of current understandings of the mental dangers
disciplinary segregation poses and the growing societal concern for
inmate populations, the analytical framework provided in Wolff v.
McDonnell239 and Sandin v. Conner240 suggests inmates facing
disciplinary segregation do have a protectable liberty interest.

234. Kniffin, supra note 223, at 70–71. Oliver Wendell Holmes accurately captured this
sentiment when he said, “We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.” Id. at 70 n.90 (quoting
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897)).
235. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
236. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
237. See id.; Kniffin, supra note 223, at 70–71.
238. See Kniffin, supra note 223, at 77 (citing Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d 709 (4th Cir.
1967), aff’d, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (describing how, under Supreme Court precedent, an inmate
would have faced years of imprisonment before he could challenge his conviction)).
239. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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Wolff made clear that inmates, while not enjoying the full panoply of
rights, do have liberty interests that may invoke Fifth Amendment due
process protections.241 Sandin stated that inmates facing solitary
confinement do not possess strong due process protections because they
are not facing an “atypical and significant hardship” differing from
ordinary prison life;242 however, as established in Part VI, disciplinary
segregation is both atypical and significant. The vast majority of the
prison population does not experience disciplinary segregation in the
BOP, particularly when discussing ADX, so it is in fact significant.243
Further, it is a significant hardship because the inmates in disciplinary
segregation face negative psychological effects—and not to a minor
degree.244 There is little doubt these inmates face an atypical and
significant hardship invoking due process protections under the Fifth
Amendment.
Relevant to the analysis is that disciplinary confinement may work
contrary to effective prison administration and achievement of
penological interests. Disciplinary segregation is incredibly expensive
compared with general population prisons, medium security prisons, and
high security prisons.245 There is also a complete lack of evidence
demonstrating disciplinary segregation reduces violence and assaults in
prisons.246 The former alone is not a reason to question a prison policy
or program, but when compounded with the latter proposition, there
seems to be little reason to defer to prison administration. The value of
disciplinary confinement in the BOP is thrown further into question
when noting that inmates who spent significant time in disciplinary
segregation have higher rates of recidivism.247 It is also important to
note the government’s seemingly widespread recognition of the dangers
disciplinary confinement poses, as well as the growing public outcry over
its use—evidenced by a number of campaigns fighting the use of solitary
confinement.248

240. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
241. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56.
242. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
243. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 1–2.
244. See, e.g., Grassian, supra note 193, at 1451–53.
245. See supra Part V.A.
246. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 34–35.
247. See supra Part V.B.
248. See, e.g., Carl Takei, New Limits Announced on ICE’s Solitary Confinement of
Immigrants,
ACLU:
SPEAK
FREELY,
(Sept.
6,
2013,
4:06
PM),
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In light of all that, it cannot be maintained that the current BOP
procedure for placement in disciplinary confinement meets the required
procedural safeguards.249 The recognition that disciplinary confinement
is an “atypical and significant hardship” brings Sandin and Wilkinson in
line with prior due process cases that focused on the nature of the
deprivation—Morrissey and Wolff. Due process protections are flexible,
and here they are strong in the face of grievous loss.
VIII.WHAT DUE PROCESS IS REQUIRED WHEN DETERMINING
WHETHER DISCIPLINARY CONFINEMENT IS APPROPRIATE
The issues surrounding current disciplinary confinement policies—
ADX in the BOP—do not call for an entirely new system, nor are they
designed to burden the prison administration. Morrissey v. Brewer set
out basic and flexible standards for meeting due process requirements
that adequately address the imposition of disciplinary segregation,250 as
it is an “atypical and significant hardship” deserving procedural
safeguards.251 Due process in this case requires at least two additions to
the current process: the right to confront one’s accuser and the right to
call witnesses in one’s defense.
There is little value in hiding the accuser from the accused inmate. It
is either a prison staff member, who need not fear the inmate’s
retaliation, or it is another inmate, who is already known as the victim of
the accused’s conduct. At the very least, it is important any of the
reviewing authorities meet with the accuser in camera, prepared with
questions from the accused, so that the authorities may determine for
themselves the reliability of the accuser—reliance on a written
statement is merely that and nothing more: reliance.
The right to call witnesses poses the same problem, which is easily
resolved by meeting in camera with questions provided by the accused.
The secondary issue with calling witnesses is the problems it may cause
with prison administration, particularly when the witness is a staff
member with other responsibilities to take care of. However, as
discussed above, there are potentially serious consequences to placing
someone in solitary confinement, concerns warranting due process, so

https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights-prisoners-rights/new-limits-announced-ices-solita
ry-confinement-immigrants [perma.cc/UCC4-WQZQ]; see also supra Part VI.C.
249. But see Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 230 (2005).
250. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
251. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).
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efficient prison administration should not overcome the constitutional
commands of the Fifth Amendment.
It is essential that all inmates facing placement in ADX disciplinary
segregation be granted their due process rights. They are facing the loss
of a liberty not contemplated in their initial sentence and newly created
by the BOP’s own policies and are thus granted protections under the
Fifth Amendment—not the least of which are the rights to face one’s
accuser and call witnesses in one’s defense. Under the reasoning
provided by Sandin v. Conner,252 and in light of modern psychology,
imposition of solitary confinement on any inmate requires added
procedural safeguards.
GRANT HENDERSON

252. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

